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Abstract 
Human reliability assessments (HRA) are typically completed by eliciting expert opinion. 
Data used are subjective and are prone to uncertainty and errors. This thesis outlines an 
HRA method using a Bayesian network (BN) model to evaluate human performance in 
emergency scenarios using a virtual environment (VE). VE can be used to simulate 
emergency situations to evaluate human performance in an environment that is controlled 
and safe and gives access to data that is based on an experimental method, rather than 
expert opinion. This method involves selecting appropriate performance shaping factors 
(PSFs) that are varied into different states to create credible scenarios in the VE to 
observe human performance.  The virtual experimental technique provides a way to 
collect data to quantify a BN.  The BN approach is suited to the assessment of human 
reliability due to its ability to 1) characterize dependency among different performance 
shaping factors (PSFs) and human errors, 2) incorporate new evidence as it becomes 
available, and 3) quantify the impact of different PSFs on different individuals. This 
paper presents an extension of the work done by Musharraf et al. (2014) by introducing 
PSFs that were purposively selected based on the ability to implement them in the VE, 
their relevance to real-life situations, and whether they could be controlled to minimize 
the effects of variables other than the chosen PSF. The PSFs used in this paper are 
complexity, stress, and uncertainty.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Offshore oil and gas accidents have resulted in loss of life, loss of capital assets, and 
damage to the environment. Accident investigations provide valuable information about 
the root causes of accidents. The root causes of a significant number of accidents have 
been attributed to human error, or employees failing to follow safety policies and 
procedures (Dimattia et al., 2005). However, the information from accident investigations 
is a reactive way of gathering information about human reliability.  
Human reliability assessment (HRA) techniques are used to predict people’s 
performance, including their response to emergencies. Human performance data required 
to perform HRA in emergency scenarios are not readily available. Due to lack of 
available data on human performance in emergencies, HRA analysis is usually done 
using expert opinion (Groth et al., 2014). Expert opinion, while valid in certain 
circumstances, can lead to uncertainty in results (Musharraf et al., 2013). This uncertainty 
can be reduced by use of a virtual environment (VE) to gather data on people’s 
performance during emergency situations. Another limitation of most HRA methods is 
that they do not consider dependency amongst performance shaping factors and 
associated actions (Musharraf et al., 2013).                  
Offshore incidents such as the Piper Alpha in 1988 and the Deepwater Horizon in 2012 
are examples where human factors affected performance during an emergency (Flin & 
Slaven, 1995; Flin et al., 1996; Norazahar et al., 2014). The incidents began due to 
technical failure, however human performance during the emergency situation was 
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inadequate due to lack of emergency preparedness. The inquiry into the Piper Alpha 
accident (Cullen, 1990) concluded that the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) may not 
have been competent in dealing with emergency situations. The OIM was assumed to be 
appointed by job-specific requirements, rather than based on an assessment of their 
ability to handle and manage an emergency situation (Flin & Slaven, 1995). Deepwater 
Horizon was a major accident that required personnel to evacuate the platform. An 
investigation into the accident concluded that there was a lack of emergency 
preparedness, which resulted in personnel errors in the evacuation procedures. Personnel 
had difficulty in moving through the emergency routes due to emergency conditions, and 
were disorganized at the muster point (Norazahar et al., 2014). Current training practices 
do not allow for training in conditions other than ideal. By conducting a HRA using a 
simulated environment, information regarding personnel’s performance during realistic 
emergency situations can be gathered, which might be useful for providing additional 
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The research presented in this thesis proposes a Human Reliability Assessment technique 
that utilizes a Bayesian network (BN) model to assess human reliability in emergency 
scenarios using a VE. The BN model has the ability to characterize dependency among 
different attributes (Groth et al., 2012b). Attributes can be any factor that the researcher is 
interested in. For this research, the attributes of interest are performance shaping factors 
(PSFs) and human errors. This approach provides a means to quantify the impact of 
different factors on an overall event.  The virtual experiment technique provides a way to 
collect data to quantify a BN.  By using a BN in combination with a VE, the uncertainty 
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in results can be reduced, and a person’s response in emergency situations can be 
assessed. 
Musharraf et al. (2018, 2014, 2013) presented a VE based technique to predict an 
individual’s failure probability in emergency situations. They used data from a VE to 
quantify a BN to assess human reliability in offshore emergency conditions. Three PSFs 
were considered in the experiment: training, visibility, and complexity. These were 
selected based on a task analysis and the capability of the VE. The factors were varied at 
different levels, and data to quantify the BN were collected. Results from the study 
indicated that this method is a viable way to overcome uncertainty associated with expert 
opinion, to create a realistic way to demonstrate dependency amongst PSFs, and to 
estimate human error more accurately. However, choice of the PSFs in the study was 
constrained by the VE’s capability and did not provide an ideal representation of offshore 
emergency scenarios.  
The research presented in this thesis extends the same experimental technique, but aims 
to address the limitations of the previous study. Scenarios for the VE were developed that 
accurately represent emergency situations on an offshore oil and gas facility.  The PSFs 
selected for this research are complexity, stress, and uncertainty.. The lack of knowledge 
about how these factors affect individuals’ performance in emergencies undermines 
organizations’ ability to manage safety. This is especially important in the offshore oil 
and gas industry where facilities tend to be remote and external emergency response is 
not immediate (Flin et al., 1996).  
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This thesis starts with a literature review into the background of BN, VE, and HRA 
techniques.  The experimental design and procedures are described in sections 3 and 4. 
Data collection and analysis follow, and finally results and discussion are presented. The 
conclusion section summarizes the thesis and suggests future lines of enquiry.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
A literature review was completed on the various aspects of the proposed experiment 
before research began. This was done to determine the current state of knowledge of 
HRA methods, BNs, and virtual environments. The review investigated what other 
researchers have done. This information was considered in the development of this 
research to ensure that the current work would contribute to the field of HRA research 
and practice.  
The subjects reviewed and researched include current HRA methods (Section 2.1), PSF 
selection (Section 2.2), BN overview (Section 2.3), BN approach to HRA (Section 2.4), 
and virtual environments (Section 2.5).  
2.1 Conventional HRA methods 
HRA methods have been used since the 1960s (Bell & Holroyd, 2009). Early HRA 
methods considered a human as a mechanical component that can fail while performing a 
task (Kirwan, 1994). These methods are referred to as the first generation methods. 
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Success Likelihood 
Index Method (SLIM) are examples of first generation methods. These methods focused 
on physical tasks that caused or may cause an error. As interest in HRA methods 
increased, it was realized that the cognitive aspects of humans need to be considered 
when assessing human reliability (Bell & Holroyd, 2009). This led to the introduction of 
second generation HRA methods. Rather than focusing on the frequency of the error, the 
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second generation methods focus on the causes of the errors. Simplified Plant Risk 
Human Reliability Assessment (SPAR-H) is an example of second generation methods. 
Both first and second generation methods aim to assess a human error probability (HEP). 
Quantification of HEP often involves investigating the effect of performance shaping 
factors (PSFs) on human performance. These are factors that can influence human 
performance (Groth & Mosleh, 2012a). The majority of second generation HRA methods 
use expert opinion to define the relationship between PSFs and human performance. The 
HEART, SLIM, SPAR-H, and IDAC methods are outlined below to give an 
understanding of conventional HRA methods and how expert opinion influences HEP 
calculation and overall Human Reliability Assessment. 
HEART is a simple and quick assessment that was first outlined in 1985 (Kirwan, 1994). 
It elicits expert opinion, requiring a minimum of one assessor who has adequate 
education and experience in the field of interest (Bell & Holroyd, 2009). An HEP is 
calculated by selecting from a list of generic nominal HEP values and a specific list of 
PSFs (called Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) for the HEART method) that relate to 
the task to be assessed. The nominal HEP list and EPC list are specific to the HEART 
method, however selection from the list is based on expert opinion (Kirwan, 1994). 
An expert will select a certain number of EPCs to be included in the assessment from the 
provided lists based on their knowledge and experience in the event being assessed 
(Kirwan, 1996). The values associated with the selected EPCs are known as the 
Maximum Effect (ME) and are specific to each EPC.  The next step in the HEART 
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assessment is to assign an Assessed Proportion of Effect (APOE) to each EPC selected by 
the expert and calculate an Assessed Effect (AE) as per equation 1. The APOE is the 
percentage of effect that each EPC is estimated to have on the overall HEP (the value is 
between 0 and 1). The selection of APOE is based on expert judgement and very little 
guidance has been given on how to assign it (Kirwan, 1997). The calculated AE of each 
EPC is then multiplied by the initial generic nominal HEP selected (equation 2). 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = ��𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 − 1� ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖� + 1  (1) 
𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∗  ∏ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖               (2) 
As described, the HEART method is very subjective and the final HEP can vary 
drastically depending on values selected from the predetermined lists and expert opinion 
(Kirwan, 1994). It is also specific to the situation being assessed and the end result may 
not be transferable to other situations (Kirwan, 1996).  
SLIM uses a cohort of experts to complete an assessment. The cohort comprises of at 
least three experts who are knowledgeable and experienced in the subject matter being 
assessed. They breakdown the event to be analyzed into manageable tasks, and determine 
a set of PSFs through discussion and review. The cohort continues to use expert 
judgement to rate each PSF on a scale of 1 to 9 (sub-optimal to optimal) (R in equation 
3), and allocate a weighting to the PSF by level of importance (W in equation 4). A 
Success Likelihood Index (SLI) is calculated and input into a simple logarithmic 
equation, as shown in equations 3 and 4. The equation (4) converts the SLI into a 
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probability. The values of a and b in equation 4 are estimated values based on previous 
SLIM calculations in a similar situation (Kirwan, 1994). 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (3) 
log𝐴𝐴 = 𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏   (4) 
The process of PSF selection and weighting can vary depending on the selected cohort 
(Kirwan, 1994). Dimattia et al. (2005) presented a SLIM technique for offshore platform 
musters where a cohort of 24 experts selected 6 PSFs for the assessment of the event. In 
comparison, the SLIM method that Musharraf et al. (2013) completed to validate her 
proposed BN Model used 3 PSFs and only 1 expert. As well, like HEART, SLIM is 
based on the situation assessed and cannot be updated as new information about a 
situation becomes available (Musharraf et al., 2013).  
The SPAR- H method is widely used in the nuclear industry (Groth & Swiler, 2013). The 
most recent version was updated in 1999 and its format is based upon the HEART 
method (Bell & Holroyd, 2009). The SPAR-H Method has a set list of 8 PSFs with a set 
level describing each PSF. Three PSFs are normally selected for evaluation by an expert 
assessor (Bell & Holroyd, 2009). This method employs a pre-determined set of 
worksheets to calculate a HEP. This worksheet can vary slightly depending on the level 
of HRA analysis the assessor is completing (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). While the 
equations in the worksheet remain the same, the multipliers for PSFs and nominal HEP 
values are different depending on the type of assessment selected (Groth & Swiler, 2013). 
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It is suggested that the worksheet simplifies the HEP calculation process and therefore is 
very useful when a detailed assessment is not required (Bell & Holroyd, 2009).  
The Information, Decision and Action in crew Context model (IDAC) is a second 
generation HRA Method. Second generation models are predictive and include 
experimental validation. These models are different from the first generation models, 
which are primarily based on subjective assessment (Chang & Mosleh, 2007).  IDAC is a  
causal model of an operator’s behavior at the cognitive level. The model probabilistically 
simulates operators’ behavior under the influence of PSFs present during an event (Chang 
& Mosleh, 2007).  It is primarily used for operational type assessments and lacks 
information with regard to maintenance activities or emergency response decisions 
making (Groth & Mosleh, 2012a). 
Behaviour is assessed by an expert using generic rules that determine the dynamic 
responses of the operator (Chang & Mosleh, 2007). It is represented by three kinds of 
responses. They are the information response, decision response, and action response. 
The information response determines the information to be assessed, processed and 
prioritized, and defines the problem in the scenario that is to be addressed. The decision 
response determines a strategy and makes decisions or develops solutions based on 
knowledge. The action response creates an action sequence based upon the decisions 
made in the previous response step. Cognitive and psychological states of the operator 
being assessed factor into all these responses. (Musharraf et al., 2013). The IDAC model 
consists of internal and external PSFs organized in a map of information that incorporates 
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each of these responses.  Assessment is conducted in a bottom up approach from the 
scenario to be assessed to the final human performance (Groth & Mosleh, 2012a).  
An HEP is calculated using several data sheets that provide the information gathered 
from site visits and operator interviews regarding the scenario and event to be assessed in 
combination with assigned probabilities of each response as a function of the PSF state.  
(Chang & Moelsh, 2007; Groth & Mosleh, 2012b).  
As noted in all the HRA methods reviewed, expert judgement and opinion is a very 
important factor into the HEP calculation. Results can vary across experts with different 
opinions and background. It is also noted that the data is specific to an event or situation 
being assessed. There is a need to reduce or remove the dependency on expert opinion for 
HRAs. The method of utilizing a simulator to gather real-time data that is presented in 
this thesis addressed that need.   
2.2 PSF Selection 
PSFs are the factors that can affect human performance (Groth & Mosleh, 2012a). For 
many HRA methods, PSFs are applied in a human error probability (HEP) calculation to 
increase or decrease the value based on the affect it may have. Careful selection of PSFs 
is an important step in HRA development (Groth & Mosleh, 2012b). A review was 
completed of the list of PSFs for conventional HRA methods. As seen in section 2.1, 
conventional methods have a specified list of PSFs for HEP calculation (Kirwan, 1994; 
Bell & Holroyd, 2009). The PSFs and their corresponding values used in traditional HRA 
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methods are usually specific to the purpose and industry for which the method is applied 
(Kim & Jung, 2003). When using a specific HRA method to calculate HEP, the PSF 
selection is based on expert opinion and the situation to be evaluated.  
There is not a standard set of PSFs to be used, so when comparing results between 
assessors or between methods, there can be errors or deficiencies in the results (Groth & 
Mosleh, 2012a; Kim & Jung, 2003). This is seen as a challenge in selecting PSFs to be 
used for the analysis of an experiment. Several researchers have also recognized this 
challenge and have made attempts to create a generic PSF list for HRA practitioners to 
use in assessments.  
In Groth & Mosleh (2012a), the author reviews multiple HRA methods and databases to 
create a comprehensive list of PSFs that can be used in HRA methods. It is stated that 
previous PSFs in use are not defined specifically enough to ensure consistent 
interpretation across various methods. Groth’s paper (2012a) describes a hierarchy of 
PSFs and categorizes them into groups such as organizational, team, person, stress, and 
machine based factors. Each PSF in the categories are defined so they can be applied to 
any HRA methods.  
The author suggests that the hierarchy can be used for different analysis methods, such as 
computer modeling, manual interpretation, and HEP calculations in HRA methods. This 
point is applicable to the experiment described in this thesis as there is no specific list for 
the method proposed.   
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Another author, Rangra et al. (2015), has also completed research on PSFs for use in 
HRA assessments. Rangra et al.’s focus is specific to emergency scenarios for the railway 
industry. The paper presents a relevant list of PSFs to be used for a railway specific HRA.  
Kim & Jung (2003) has completed work similar to Groth & Mosleh (2012a) and Rangra 
et al. (2015). This author’s focus is on proposing a taxonomy of PSFs for emergency 
tasks in nuclear power plant operations.  The process the author completed to create a full 
set of PSFs was to review traditional HRA methods and several databases of HRA and 
incident investigation information. The author reviewed the PSF information, selected a 
list of PSFs, and defined sub items that can be applied to certain emergency situations.  
The PSF list was categorized into four sections – human, system, task, environment – 
which were then defined further into subgroups. The subgroups are based on frequency of 
use in HRA methods. The terminology for each PSF is specific and practical.  
Groth & Mosleh (2012a),  Rangra et al. (2015), and Kim & Jung (2003) agree that the 
situation the PSFs are being applied to is required to be clearly defined in terms of the 
unit of analysis (e.g. person versus team), and if there are sub events to be considered. 
Careful definition is important so PSFs selected are independent and do not overlap 
(Groth & Mosleh, 2012a). They also all state that the definition of PSFs is important to 
selection for HRA.  Training and experience are examples of PSFs that require further 
definition. Experience differs for each member of a crew, but training could be the same. 
They are often considered to be the same for accident investigation using HRA methods 
so having them further defined would make the assessment more valid (Rangra et al., 
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2015). By considering the process by which the hierarchy is created by Groth & Mosleh 
(2012a), Kim & Jung (2013), and Rangra et al. (2015), selection of PSFs can be more 
informative and potentially provide more accurate results in a HRA. PSFs that are 
defined accurately can be incorporated to the correct task context and ensure that the 
selected PSFs do not overlap (Kim & Jung , 2003). 
Groth & Mosleh (2012a) suggests starting with an expanded PSF list and as more details 
about the situation being assessed is known, narrowing down the PSFs to be used for a 
HRA. This method is followed for PSF selection for the experiment presented in this 
thesis. The proposed HRA method involves data collection from a virtual environment 
(Moyle et al., 2017). A list of PSFs was selected based on the literature review discussed 
above. The list was narrowed down based on criteria such as the ability to replicate the 
PSF in a virtual environment, if a PSF could be present in the situation to be assessed (i.e. 
if a high and low level can be created for assessment). This review was necessary in order 
to select PSFs that were interesting and can provide adequate results for assessment 
(Moyle et al., 2017).  The selection of PSFs guided the experimental design and data 
collection process. Further details on PSF selection is in section 3.4.   
2.3 BN Overview 
The experiment discussed in this thesis uses a BN technique to model dependency 
between PSFs and human error, and to calculate a HEP (Moyle et al., 2017). A BN is a 
statistical model that is used to represent causal dependency amongst different variables. 
It is composed of a set of nodes (variables) that are connected by arcs that represent 
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causal dependency. The independent nodes (i.e. nodes with no predecessor) are called 
root nodes. Probabilities of root nodes are based on the initial belief of the possibility of 
each possible state of the corresponding variable. The dependent nodes are called child 
nodes and are associated with a conditional probability component. This component 
captures how different possible states of parent nodes can affect the probability of the 
child nodes (Musharraf et al., 2013). Figure 1 shows a simple BN that represents the 
causal dependency between PSFs and human error. Here PSFs are the root nodes, and 
errors are the child nodes. Each node can have several possible states (e.g. PSFs can be 
high or low, errors can be yes or no). 
 
Figure 1: Causal dependency between PSF and Human Errors 
Bayes’ Theorem (equation 5) is used to calculate the marginal probability of each child 
node when information on the root node and conditional probabilities on variable states is 
known. The probability of event A (Errors), given that event B (PSF) has occurred, can 
be calculated using equation 5 (Haldar & Mahadevan, 2000).  
𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) = 𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴)𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴)
𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵)                                (5) 
   
 
15 
 
By applying the product rule, the marginal probability of Event A can be written in terms 
of a conditional probability distribution, as shown in equation 6 (Haldar & Mahadevan, 
2000). 
𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴) =  �𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)                           (6) 
The conditional probability distribution is presented in the form of a Conditional 
Probability Table (CPT) within the BN model. Each dependent node has an associated 
CPT. Table 1 shows an example CPT for Error1 from Figure 1.  Given the states of the 
parent PSF nodes PSF1 and PSF2, the probability of Error1 happening can be calculated 
(Musharraf et al., 2013). Equation 7 illustrates how the probability of Error1 happening 
can be calculated, given the conditional probabilities (Moyle et al., 2017).  
Table 1: Example CPT 
PSF1 High   Low 
PSF2 High Low   High Low 
Error1 - Yes 1 0   1 0 
Error1 - No 0 1   0 1 
 
𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸1 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) = 𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸1|𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 1 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ,𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ)  × 𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) + 𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸1|𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 1 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ,𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) + 𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸1|𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿,𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) 
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+ 𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸1|𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿,𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃2 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)               (7) 
The intricacy of this equation highlights that quantifying BN can be complex and are 
normally completed using software, such as Genie Modeller (Anonymous, 2017). 
A BN is useful in applying updated evidence of a node. This concept allows the 
investigation of the cause-effect relationship between the variables. Both forward analysis 
(event B to A) and backward analysis (event A to B) are possible. This is useful in 
determining root causes of events when additional evidence on a node’s occurrence is 
provided (Groth & Swiler, 2013; Musharraf et al., 2014). 
2.4 BN approach to HRA  
Traditional HRA methods consider specific equations to calculate a HEP. However, 
application of a BN in HRA is a practice that is gaining popularity amongst practitioners 
(Martins & Maturana, 2013). The benefit of a BN is that it can demonstrate the influence 
of PSFs on a HEP calculation (Groth & Mosleh, 2012b). By modelling a HEP calculation 
using a BN, the strength that a PSF can have on human errors can be quantified (Groth & 
Mosleh, 2012b). A BN allows for manipulation of its nodes which can determine if a PSF 
negatively or positively affects human performance. The BN HRA model can be 
populated by data and information from several sources including databases, a panel of 
expert opinions, or as this research aims to demonstrate, by information gathered from 
task performance in a virtual environment.   
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Groth & Swiler (2013) presents a method of transitioning the SPAR-H method into a BN.  
The PSFs listed for the SPAR-H method become the input (root nodes) of a BN model. 
This shows HRA researchers that traditional methods can be combined with a more 
modern approach in order to assess the influence of various dependencies on a situation 
(Groth & Swiler, 2013). 
In another paper, Groth & Mosleh (2012b) derives a BN from the IDAC model and 
HERA database. The HERA database was developed by the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and maintains a list of information about human factors from various 
nuclear power plants (Groth & Mosleh, 2012b).  The author selected a list of PSFs from 
the above methods based on the incident being reviewed from the nuclear power industry. 
For the transition to a BN, PSFs were connected via arcs depending on an assessed value. 
The PSFs were then assigned to an error context group which defined how likely the PSF 
will result in a human error. The BN in this model shows causal dependencies between 
PSFs and from PSFs to an error context (Groth & Swiler, 2013). 
The research provided in Martins & Maturana (2013) reviews the use of a BN to analyze 
human reliability. The method is applied to predict the risk of collision accidents of ships 
in the maritime industry. The use of BNs for a formal safety assessment in the maritime 
industry was approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2006 
(Martins & Maturana, 2013). The BN was developed based on a fault tree of a ship 
collision. A fault tree shows the connection of events to an overall top event. This 
mapping allows for a simple transition to a BN (Martins & Maturana, 2013). The authors 
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state the BN would be able to determine the elements (PSFs) that greatly impact the event 
or situation, not just an end risk value that is calculated in a fault tree (Martins & 
Maturana, 2013). The fault tree is extended to include a BN of PSFs that provide inputs 
to the basic events of the fault tree. The basic events that are expanded are potential 
human errors that may occur (Martins & Maturana, 2013). Similar to the work by Groth 
& Mosleh (2012a) and Groth & Swiler (2013), the data for the BN calculated was 
populated by expert opinion. Martins & Maturana (2013) provides a method that is 
different than Groth & Mosleh (2012a) and Groth & Swiler (2013), however it is still 
focused on the use of subject matter experts to provide data to populate a BN to calculate 
a HEP.  
Another author has completed research into utilizing BNs for safety assessments in the 
maritime industry. Hänninen et al. (2014) presents a BN model that demonstrates the link 
between elements of the maritime safety management system (SMS) (referred to as a 
submodel) and past safety indicators such as accident involvement, reported incidents, 
and port inspections (referred to as the main model). Like the models previously 
described, the data for the BN model is elicited from experts experienced in the industry 
and situation being assessed. For development of the submodel, the experts involved in 
this research selected points of interest from the SMS, which became nodes of the 
submodel BN. The submodel links to the main model via a node called “safety”. The 
“safety” node is an abstract variable. This is to represent that the main model nodes 
should not be viewed as safety management indicators directly, but can influence the 
belief of the nodes in the submodel.  The method is more focused on interactions between 
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business areas of the SMS rather than human behavior, and therefore can predict 
consequences of changes in safety management procedures (Hänninen et al., 2014).  
Musharraf et al. (2013, 2014, 2018) has also completed work on the development of a BN 
model for HRA methods. The author has investigated different data gathering methods 
and various applications of a BN in assessing human performance during offshore oil and 
gas emergency situations. Musharraf et al. (2013) begins by converting an initial expert 
opinion on performance shaping factors to an initial probability value using the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory Method. This method uses a mathematical formula to convert a 
qualitative belief to a quantitative value (Musharraf et al., 2013). This value is the prior 
probability that is input to a BN for the HRA model in order to calculate a HEP. The 
PSFs were selected from the IDAC model, similar to Groth & Mosleh (2012b). The BN 
model was developed by connecting the selected PSFs to task events from the situation 
being assessed. The connections illustrate the dependencies between PSFs and the task 
events.   
In Musharraf et al. (2014), a BN model was developed using a different approach.  PSFs 
were selected based on a review of the situation to be assessed and how they could be 
replicated in a virtual environment. The use of a virtual environment to gather data is 
innovative as it relies upon the capabilities of a simulator to capture performance data and 
uses this data as inputs into the BN model. This process replaces the dependency on 
expert opinions for HEP calculation and HRA modelling (Musharraf et al., 2014). 
However, this model calculated a general HEP for participants as a group rather than for 
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individuals. This does not allow for an assessment to be completed accurately on an 
individual in order to determine how PSFs specifically affect a participant. Therefore, 
Musharraf et al. (2017) expanded again on the previous research to include more 
inclusive PSFs and a BN model for assessing individual reactions to PSFs and to 
calculate a HEP for each participant.  
Along with the movement to develop BN models for use in HRA analysis, there has been 
a review of how methods are developed and recommendations made on how to improve 
them (Mkrtchyan et al., 2015). One of the recommendations is to enhance the explanation 
of how the BN model was developed. A finding from the review stated above is that BNs 
are typically presented to the reader without an explanation as to how or why it was 
structured in a particular way (Mkrtchyan et al., 2015).  Clarification of how to build 
BNs, such as node selection and definition, structure development, and how to populate 
conditional probability tables (CPTs), needs to be included so researchers can appreciate 
and understand how to develop a BN for use in a HRA. For example, defining the node 
based on the application and the definition of the node state (yes or no, high or low) can 
further assist HRA practitioners in developing a BN for their own assessments.  
The review also identified several positive features in the use of BNs for a HRA. Positive 
features included ability to graphically represent a complex situation showing 
dependency between PSFs and task errors, and the ability to combine data from various 
sources in a mathematical model (Mkrtchyan, et al., 2015). These aspects have been 
echoed by authors such as Groth & Swiler (2013) and Musharraf et al. (2013, 2014, 
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2017) in their research. Groth & Swiler (2013) also states that while the BN can be used 
to perform a causal reasoning between PSFs and task errors, it can also be used to 
determine the strength of influence of different PSFs on human error (Musharraf et al., 
2014). The mathematical concept of this is outlined in section 2.3.  
HRA data currently comes from a variety of sources, such as expert opinion, previously 
calculated data, and a database of recorded data from actual incidents. Variability in a BN 
calculation using expert opinions arise due to the different backgrounds and knowledge 
of experts (Hanninen et al., 2014). Mkrtchyan et al. (2015) states expert data are an 
important source of data, but also says that capturing data from a simulator can be useful 
for populating a BN and can eliminate the need for expert opinion. Again, Groth & 
Swiler (2013), Rangra et al. (2015), and Musharraf et al. (2013, 2014, 2018) state the 
importance of simulator data in the development of using a BN. Musharraf et al. (2013, 
2014, 2018) use simulator data as the basis for research presented in all three papers.  
2.5 VE Overview 
Using a virtual environment for safety training is expected to improve emergency 
preparedness for regular and ad hoc workers on offshore platforms. It is also expected to 
reduce the induction period for workers new to an offshore platform by providing a 
medium to introduce them to the new place of work before they get there. Simulators also 
give insights into a participant’s reaction to stressful situations and can be used as a 
screening tool to identify those who do not do well during emergency situations (Flin & 
Slaven, 1995). 
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This section reviews the use of virtual environments to gather information on a 
participants’ strengths and weaknesses during performance in different egress and 
evacuation conditions. The virtual environment used in this research is a simulator called 
the All-hands Virtual Environment Response Trainer (AVERT) (Veitch et al., 2008). 
AVERT (Figure 2) allows users to gain experience in naturalistic emergency scenarios in 
a safe and controlled manner. AVERT replicates an offshore oil and gas facility in which 
users can learn knowledge and skills regarding offshore emergency safety procedures. 
Training programs can be designed in AVERT to introduce users to platform layout, 
alarm types, potential hazards, and appropriate responses (Moyle et al., 2017).  
Users are required to undergo a training program that introduces them to an offshore oil 
and gas facility layout, alarm types, and how to respond to the alarms in an appropriate 
manner. The experiment presented in this thesis expands on this training to expose 
participants to realistic emergency scenarios that are at a higher stress level than the 
training scenarios. This allows researchers to gather information on performance in an 
emergency scenario that would otherwise be unavailable until after an emergency 
occurred (Moyle et al., 2017).  
Musharraf et al. (2014, 2018) used AVERT to collect data on participants’ performance 
in emergency situations. They created scenarios using three different PSFs and recorded 
performance data for each participant. This data was input into a BN-HRA for analysis 
resulting in a HEP calculation. Groth et al. (2014) also incorporated simulator data in a 
HRA to enhance HEP calculations.   
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Figure 2: Example AVERT Scenes 
 
Simulators are a beneficial way of capturing human response data in controlled 
conditions. (Mkrtchyan et al., 2015). There are arguments that simulator data does not 
represent expected conditions, however a simulator can enhance or diminish a situation 
by incorporating performance shaping factors. PSFs are manipulations of the 
environment and are usually factors of interest in an experiment (Moyle et al., 2017). By 
inputting the collected data into a BN, the probability of error (whether a participant 
completes a task successfully or not) given a PSF is present can be calculated. The value 
is more accurate than calculating a probability of error without knowing the influence of 
factors (Groth et al., 2014).  
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Chapter 3 Design of Experiment 
3.1 Methodology 
The methodology followed for the experiment is outlined in Figure 3. The context of 
interest was emergency response on an offshore petroleum installation. The author 
developed and implemented the experiment in conjunction with an experiment for the 
assessment of emergency procedure skill retention.  
A task analysis of this activity was the first step in the research. The tasks of interest were 
the safety compliance procedures associated with emergency situations. After the task 
analysis, a list of factors that can influence task performance was generated. The next 
step was to model the dependency between the PSFs and task performance using BN. 
Scenarios were created in AVERT by the author to gather the data required to quantify a 
BN (Moyle & Veitch, 2017).  
The author collected data by observing the performance of 37 volunteer human 
participants in the virtual scenarios (Moyle et al., 2017). The data were integrated into the 
BN and the reliability of participants was assessed. Sections 5 and 6 further describe this 
process in detail. 
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Figure 3: HRA Experiment Methodology 
 
3.2 Experimental setup  
The 37 human participants were recruited from a cohort that completed an initial 
Simulator-Based Mastery of Learning (SBML) experiment (Smith & Veitch, 2019). 
Participants were required to complete a training program that was developed in AVERT 
that would provide all the necessary knowledge and skills required for completing an 
offshore emergency scenario. The training program introduced the participants to the 
virtual model of a Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading vessel (FPSO), and 
provided an environment that taught offshore emergency rules and requirements in 
training blocks. Participants were tested and retrained until they were fully competent in 
the training material. Figure 4 shows how the SBML, Retention and HRA experiments 
relate to each other. The SBML & Retention portion of the flow chart shows the training 
and testing sequence participants completed. They were first introduced to the AVERT 
program and the model of the FPSO in a habituation Stage. Participants then completed a 
series of training (block numbers 1 through 8) and testing scenarios that gradually 
increased in difficulty. Once all testing scenarios were passed successfully, the participant 
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was deemed to be competent in performing offshore safety procedures in AVERT (Smith 
& Veitch, 2019).  6-9 months after the initial SBML training, the participants completed 
another study to determine the effectiveness of the SBML training in retaining the 
information taught, including the extent to which their skills had declined. Participants 
were exposed to the virtual environment again and were re-tested using the initial testing 
scenarios from the SBML training. Data on the retention of skills and knowledge of 
offshore emergency rules were evaluated (Doody et al., 2017). Participants were tested, 
and retrained if necessary in training blocks, until all scenarios were completed 
successfully.  
If participants completed the retention study successfully and thus demonstrated 
competence in performing offshore safety procedures, they were invited to participate in 
the experiment addressed in this thesis, which is shown as the HRA study portion of 
Figure 4. This experiment assessed a participant’s application of the skills and knowledge 
learned during the SBML and Retention study by exposing the participants to a series of 
8 scenarios with varying degrees of performance shaping factors. This is shown in the 
figure as HRA 1 through HRA 8. It has to be noted that the participants did not complete 
the scenarios in the same order, but were exposed to a random sequence. 
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3.3 Procedure Selection & Task Analysis 
The muster sequence required to be completed during an offshore emergency situation is 
the procedure to be assessed for the research.  The area within the AVERT model to be 
used was the Accommodation block.  
A task analysis from Dimattia et al. (2005) on muster actions required during an 
emergency situation was used as the basis for creating the BN model and development of 
scenarios. Dimattia et al. (2005) presents a list of actions required, beginning at the time 
of muster initiation, through to platform egress and evacuation. This is when individuals 
are more likely to be exposed to hazards like heat, smoke, pressure, and to high levels of 
stress.  
The task hierarchy of egress and evacuation during a muster scenario is outlined in Figure 
5. This list was developed by a cohort of experts that participated in the SLIM analysis 
for Dimattia et al. (2005). The required actions are independent of the type of emergency 
and are to be completed regardless of the type of incident. Incidents that require actions 
for platform abandonment were not considered for this research and are not discussed. 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the influence of the selected PSFs on task 
performance during a muster sequence only (Moyle et al., 2017). 
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Figure 5: Task Hierarchy for safety procedures during an offshore emergency situation. 
Adapted from DiMattia, et al. (2005) 
3.4 PSF Selection and Experimental Design 
Varying the intensity of PSFs can affect participants’ ability to complete emergency 
scenarios successfully. Observing participants’ performance at different levels of the 
PSFs can help assess their strengths and weaknesses during an assigned task (Musharraf 
et al., 2014). According to Boring (2010), keeping the PSF list relatively short for 
analysis (three or four) reduces the chance of having PSFs that overlap in definition. This 
agrees with Kirwan (1994) who states that 3 or 4 PSFs give more accurate results in an 
HRA. The choice on how many to use is often based on expert opinion, or can be a 
systematic process where a set is reviewed, quantitative analysis is performed, and the 
PSF set refined (Groth & Mosleh, 2012b). 
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Three PSFs were selected based on their relevance to the context of the selected task. The 
factors selected were complexity, stress, and uncertainty (Moyle et al., 2017). These 
factors can be defined in a variety of ways. PSFs were selected based on a set of criteria, 
such as the ability to implement them in AVERT, their relevance to real-life situations, 
and whether they could be controlled to minimize the effects of variables other than the 
chosen PSF. (Moyle et al., 2017). Figure 6 shows the evolution of the PSFs from 
selection to implementation in AVERT. The process started with a high level election of 
the PSFs, and then each PSF was focused to determine variables that could be varied in 
each scenario.  
Figure 6: PSF Definition 
Each PSF was assigned a high and low level of implementation. The high level for 
complexity was set by starting at a familiar location in AVERT. The cabin area of the 
accommodation was used for this as it was familiar to participants due to the SBML 
training. The low level of complexity was set by starting the scenario at a less familiar 
location. This was selected to be the Bridge on the navigation deck. Stress was varied by 
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changing the proximity of the participant to a hazard. At the high level, the participant 
had no chance of interaction with a hazard. The hazard locations were in an area that the 
participant would not have access to. At the low level, the participant could observe a 
hazard depending on route selection during the scenario. Uncertainty was varied by 
changing the quality of the information communicated in the announcements made 
during the emergency scenarios. High level provided an announcement having all 
relevant information for the participant to make an informed decision on how to muster, 
such as if a route was blocked by a hazard and where the hazard was located. A low level 
provided less pertinent information about the scenario and just directed the participant to 
muster (Moyle et al., 2017). 
Figure 7 shows the experiment design schematic. This figure demonstrates the link 
between PSF, task to be completed, and the response assessed from the performance in 
AVERT. 
 
Figure 7 Schematic of Experimental Design 
32 
3.5 BN Development 
The BN model, as seen in Figure 8, shows the dependency between the PSFs and the task 
performance, and then between the task performance and the completion of emergency 
safety procedures.. Tasks were defined as the child node and represent the critical level of 
the BN. Failure or success of each task depends on the states of the PSFs, which are the 
root nodes in the BN. The relationship between the PSFs and individual task performance 
is shown in the upper two levels. The lower two levels show how the probability of 
individual task performance can be combined to get an overall probability of successful 
muster. This was done is two steps. Task performance probabilities were first combined 
to get a dependent probability for two categories: compliance with safety procedures, and 
spatial awareness. Probabilities of these categories were then combined to get the final 
probability of successful muster. The reason behind taking an extra step to combine tasks 
into different categories is to make the computation more manageable (Moyle et al., 
2017).  
Data needed to fully quantify the BN shown in Figure 8 are the prior probabilities of 
PSFs, the CPTs of task nodes, the CPTs of intermediate category nodes, and the CPT of 
the final muster completion node. Two types of data are needed to define the relationship 
between the PSFs and task performance. First, the prior probabilities of the PSF nodes are 
needed. Prior probabilities refer to the initial belief about the likelihood of each state of 
the PSFs. Next, the relationship between the PSF and task performance is needed to 
populate the CPT tables for each task performance node. This is the data that is collected  
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from AVERT during participant performance (Moyle et al., 2017). Detailed information 
on AVERT data collection is in Section 5. 
CPTs of category nodes and the final node are defined by the analyst. These definitions 
are based on the importance of different tasks to the specified categories. They are 
context sensitive and may need refinement before being used in a different application 
(Moyle et al., 2017). Refer to Section 6.2 for further information.  
3.6 AVERT Scenario Development 
A two-state, three factor experiment was created in AVERT to collect data to investigate 
the influence of PSFs on task performance. Eight different scenarios were developed that 
incorporated the high and low level of each PSF and the muster task performance list 
(Montgomery, 2008). Table 2 presents the list of scenarios and shows how PSFs were 
defined for each scenario.   
The PSF level and the muster performance task list formed the basis for scenario creation. 
Storyboards on the desired outcome for each scenario were created. Each aspect of the 
scenario was scrutinized to ensure there were no confounding effects on the factors to be 
assessed. Once details were finalized, the scenarios were implemented in AVERT for use 
during the experiment.  
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Table 2: Scenarios for AVERT 
 
Communication Hazard Proximity Situation Familiarity 
1 + 
PA announcement clear, 
concise, and all relevant 
information 
+ 
Hazard location in 
area of no 
participant access  
+ Scenario starts in cabin 
2 - PA announcement lacking relevant information.  + 
Hazard location in 
area of no 
participant access 
+ Scenario starts in cabin 
3 + 
PA announcement clear, 
concise, and all relevant 
information 
- 
Hazard may be 
seen in route 
selection 
+ Scenario starts in cabin 
4 + 
PA announcement clear, 
concise, and all relevant 
information 
+ 
Hazard location in 
area of no 
participant access 
- Scenario starts in Bridge  
5 - PA announcement lacking relevant information.  - 
Hazard may be 
seen in route 
selection 
+ Scenario starts in cabin 
6 - PA announcement lacking relevant information.  + 
Hazard location in 
area of no 
participant access 
- Scenario starts in Bridge 
7 + 
PA announcement clear, 
concise, and all relevant 
information 
- 
Hazard may be 
seen in route 
selection 
- Scenario starts in Bridge 
8 - PA announcement lacking relevant information.  - 
Hazard may be 
seen in route 
selection 
- Scenario starts in Bridge 
Note: “+” denotes high level, positive influence; “-” denotes low level, negative 
influence. 
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Chapter 4 Experiment Procedure 
4.1 Participant Criteria 
To be eligible for the experiment, participants were required to meet a set of criteria, 
including no experience working offshore. The list of criteria is presented in Table 3.  
Table 3: Participant Criteria 
Question Eligible Participant Answer 
Prior Experience:  
1. Have you completed the 
Mastery of Learning Training? 
Yes.  Participants must have already 
completed AVERT Mastery of Learning 
Experiment.  
2. Have you received experience 
working offshore since the first 
AVERT study? 
No. Participants must not have any prior 
training or experience working offshore. 
3. Do you expect to receive 
training to work offshore in the 
next 3 months?  
No. Participants must not be expecting to 
receive training elsewhere during the 
course of the experiment. 
Background Information:  
1. Are you between the ages of 18 
and 65? 
Yes 
2. Do you have normal vision or 
corrected to normal vision (e.g. 
wear glasses or contacts)?  
Yes. You must have normal or corrected 
to normal vision to be able to participate 
in this study.  
3. Do you have a history of 
headaches or migraines? 
 
No. Participants who have a history of 
headaches or migraines are not eligible to 
participate in this study. 
4. Do you have a history of 
seizures or are you prone to 
seizures?  
 
No. Participants who have a history of 
seizures or are prone to seizures are not 
eligible to participate in this study. 
5. Are you susceptible to motion 
or simulator sickness?  
No. The VE may cause symptoms of 
simulator sickness. Participants who have 
a high susceptibility to motion or 
simulator sickness will not be able to 
participate in the study. 
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The HRA research experiment was conducted with 37 participants. As described in 
Section 3.2, participants were already trained to competence in basic offshore emergency 
procedures using the safety training resources in AVERT.   
4.1.1 Ethics 
An ethics application was submitted and approved in September 2016 by the 
Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR) at Memorial 
University of Newfoundland. An ICEHR review is required under the federal 
government’s Tri-Policy Council, which provides policy on the ethical conduct for 
research with human participants. Care and consideration of the participants’ well-being 
were monitored and assessed throughout the experiment. Participants were required to 
sign a consent form highlighting their rights as a participant and stating all information 
about the experiment in which they participated. 
4.2 Arriving at the lab 
Participants who contacted the researcher were sent an introductory email explaining the 
purpose of the experiment. They were also notified of participant criteria (Table 3). If this 
information was satisfactory to the participant, they were given a scheduled time to arrive 
at the laboratory where the experiments were to take place.  
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were introduced to the surroundings, and the 
workstation and building safety procedures were explained. As part of the required ethics 
application, participants were required to review and sign a consent form. A copy of the 
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consent form is presented in Moyle and Veitch (2017). The researcher reviewed the 
consent form with the participant to ensure all parties understood the research and the 
experiment goals.  
4.3 Physiological Data 
Another research project was being conducted in conjunction with the HRA study. The 
theory, methodology, and results of that study are out with the scope of this thesis. 
However, the experimental set up is an important aspect of the HRA experimental 
procedure.  
Participants were asked if physiological data resulting from their stress response during 
the HRA experiment could be collected. Three physiological measurements were taken to 
provide indicators of the participant’s virtual experience. The data is used to the level of 
stress experienced during the test scenarios. Table 4 outlines the physiological measures 
and assessment. 
Before starting the HRA experiment, sensors were applied to locations on the torso and 
hand. A five-minute seated baseline of physiological signals was collected prior to the 
start of each scenario in the HRA experiment.  
The details of the physiological related research are out of the scope of this thesis. It is 
mentioned to fully disclose what each participant was exposed to during the study. 
Results are not presented in this thesis.   
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Table 4 Physiological Measurements 
Physiological 
Signal 
Assessment 
Heart Rate (EKG) A 2-lead EKG will monitor heart activity.  An increase in 
heart rate is an indicator of stress. 
Galvanic Skin 
Response (GSR) 
GSR measures sweat gland activity by application of 
electrodes to two fingers (bi-polar arrangement), or on the 
palm and forearm (unipolar arrangement).  An increase is skin 
conductance activity is indicative of stress. 
Respiration Respiration will be recorded using a strap placed over the 
ribcage. In conjunction with heart rate variability, an increase 
in respiration variability is another indicator of stress. 
 
4.4 Experiment Briefing 
After the consent form was signed, the participant was briefed on the HRA experiment 
and what would be involved in the testing. The research purpose, objective, and goals 
were relayed to the participant. The experimental setup and process were explained, and 
the participant’s role and expectations were outlined.  
Participants were encouraged to envision the session as if it was the first day on an 
offshore platform and they were competently trained in offshore emergency procedures. 
The participants were asked to apply knowledge and skills learned during training to 
complete the emergency scenarios in the HRA experiment. To avoid the effect of 
additional learning, scenarios were not repeated and feedback on performance during 
each of the HRA test scenarios was not provided. Participants were also notified that each 
scenario would be completed in a randomly selected order.  
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Once all relevant information about the study had been relayed to the participant, testing 
and data collection could begin.   
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Chapter 5 Data Collection 
During the study briefing, participants were advised that data for the HRA study would 
be collected in the form of performance metrics, physiological signals, and subjective 
assessments. Performance metrics are the aspects of participants’ performance 
automatically captured in AVERT, and subjective assessments are answers from 
questionnaires given to the participant throughout the study. Participants were made 
aware that this data would be used to further evaluate their abilities in completing 
offshore safety procedures and potentially make changes to training instruction or 
platform emergency response procedures and processes.  
5.1 Objective Performance Data 
5.1.1 Data captured in AVERT  
AVERT produces output files that capture the performance of a participant completing a 
scenario. Data such as scenario time, number of doors opened and closed, and whether a 
hazard was entered, are examples of such data. AVERT creates an individual report for 
each scenario. Using a Python script code, each scenario report is combined to a single 
Excel summary file for analysis. This summary report file is the main data file that is 
relied upon for participant analysis.  
AVERT has the option of replaying scenarios. This is beneficial as it allows the observer 
to perform a quality assurance check on the AVERT report files and data that are 
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collected by hand (Section 5.1.2). This feature is critical to confirming aspects of 
participant performance that were not clear from the electronic report files.  
5.1.2 Data recorded by researchers 
There were limitations to what AVERT recorded. At the time the experiment was 
completed, AVERT could not track the exact movement of a participant. AVERT can 
only create an output when a participant crosses a set check point. The actions of a 
participant in between checkpoints was not recorded. An extra layer of data collection 
was required to ensure no lost data points. To address these two issues, route maps and 
movement logs were completed by the researcher. The route maps and movement logs 
were used to verify participant movements and confirm the outputs of the AVERT report 
files.  
5.2 Subjective data 
In addition to the electronic files from AVERT and researcher observed data, participants 
were asked to complete questionnaires assessing their experience in the virtual 
environment. The questionnaires that were completed are the simulator sickness 
questionnaire (SSQ), the post-trial scenario questionnaire, and emotion questionnaire. 
The emotion questionnaire is related to the physiological study mentioned in Section 4.3 
and is not included in this thesis.  
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The post-trial scenario questionnaire was completed after each scenario was completed. 
This asked questions about how realistic the simulation was to the participant and 
whether the experience met the participants’ expectations.  
The SSQs allow the researcher to monitor the participant’s physical conditions. 
Navigation through the virtual space using a desktop computer configuration may cause 
some individuals to experience symptoms of visually induced motion sickness (VIMS) or 
simulator-induced sickness (SIS) (Kennedy et al., 1993). The symptoms of simulator-
induced sickness include fatigue, headache, eye strain, difficulty focusing, increased 
salivation, sweating, nausea, stomach awareness, blurred vision, dizziness, vertigo, and 
burping. The symptoms of simulator sickness can sometimes occur during, immediately 
after, or several hours after exposure to the simulator. To ensure a participant did not 
experience severe symptoms, simulator-induced sickness susceptibility was assessed 
prior to the study and was monitored throughout the study using the SSQ (Kennedy et al., 
1993). The questionnaire allows symptoms to be rated as not present, minimal, moderate, 
and severe. A SSQ was completed prior to the start of the study, after the first four 
scenarios, and again at the end of the scenario testing. If any of the symptoms were 
reported as moderate or severe, the decision about whether the participant should 
continue with the study or not was made. The post-trial scenario questionnaire and SSQ 
that was used in the study and results are available in Moyle and Veitch (2017). 
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5.3 Transfer and Storage of Data 
The ICHER policy requires that the identity and personal information of participants are 
protected. Study policy and procedure was established to protect participant identity and 
personal information from unauthorized use. This was communicated to the participant in 
the consent form.  
Each participant was given as assigned alphanumeric number. The list that connects the 
assigned number to personal information is stored on a password protected computer in a 
locked office, providing two barriers. The participant list, consent form, and recorded 
data are not stored together.  
AVERT report files are stored on a computer dedicated to the study and transferred to an 
alternate computer for analysis. Hand drawn maps, route logs and participant 
questionnaires are stored in a locked cabinet, within a locked office space. There is no 
connection between the participant personal information to the recorded data other than 
the participant list. This is in line with the requirements under the ICHER ethics 
application. 
Participants were informed that the results and conclusions from the study may be 
published in peer reviewed journals/conferences and that a formal report will be made 
available upon request.  
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5.4 Assessment Concerns 
After the start of the experiment, it was noted that five participants had observed a “60 
Second” warning. This warning was a part of the AVERT program when the training 
program was developed, and was not removed during the scenario development for this 
study. Time stress was not a factor that was studied in this experiment, and there was 
concern that observing this warning could induce time stress in participants and therefore 
affect results.  
Amongst the five participants, there were twelve occurrences of seeing the “60 Second” 
warning. The occurrences were assessed and evaluated to determine if the warning had 
any effect on participants’ performance. Nine occurrences were while the participants 
were waiting for the scenario to end after all required tasks were completed, or very close 
to completing all tasks. Participants completed the scenario successfully in these 
occurrences and it was reckoned that the warning was unlikely to have contributed to the 
participant’s stress level. Three occurrences (twice with the same participant) happened 
while the participant was not close to finishing the scenario. The participants appeared 
confused or unsure of required actions before visually seeing the warning and it was 
reckoned that the warning was unlikely to have increased any stress already experienced 
by the participant. Once the assessment was complete, the “60 Second” time was 
removed from the scenarios so no further participants could observe it. 
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Chapter 6 Analysis & Results 
6.1 Analysis of Performance Data 
A rubric was developed to assess the performance results from AVERT and was 
populated with each participant’s performance data. Seven tasks were assessed, as listed 
in Table 5. Each of the tasks represents a node in the BN shown in Section 3.5. Each task 
is further defined by individual scenarios. This was done as each scenario is unique and 
elements had to be specific to accurately assess the performance. The populated rubric 
was saved separately from the AVERT files to offer a quick snapshot into participants’ 
performance. A copy of the rubric and each participant’s performance results are 
available in Moyle and Veitch (2017).  
Table 5: Task Performance Definitions and Locations 
Task Performance Definition Data Source 
Route Selection Participant selects most efficient route 
enabling them to muster as quickly as 
possible 
Route Map, 
Movement Log 
Muster Correctly Participant musters as per alarm type. 
Procedure to follow is defined per scenario.  
AVERT 
Gear Selection Participant selects gear as per location start. 
Procedure to follow is defined per scenario.  
AVERT 
Time to Muster Participant successfully musters and responds 
to correct alarm fully within 5 minutes 
AVERT 
Hazard Interaction Participant does not interact with hazard AVERT, Route Map, 
Movement Log 
Interaction with 
Watertight Doors 
Participant closes all safety doors they go 
through 
AVERT 
Safe Pace Participant walks throughout scenarios AVERT 
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The AVERT report files were assessed and the applicable performance metrics were 
extracted. As AVERT did not automatically capture all relevant performance metrics that 
were required for the analysis, route maps and movement logs were used to supplement 
the electronic files.  Table 5 also shows the data source for each task.   
From this table, one can see that participant A61 closed all the doors in scenarios 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6 and 8 (as indicated by the shaded boxes). In scenario 7, the participant left one or 
more doors open (as indicated by the shaded box).  
6.2 BN Analysis 
GeNIe Modeller (Anonymous, 2017) was used for the quantitative analysis presented in 
this thesis. GeNiE incorporates the equations presented in Section 2.3 to calculate the 
probability of task performance, specified categories, and finally the successful 
completion of the required safety procedures during emergency situations.  
6.2.1 Performance Shaping Factors  Nodes 
For this study, prior probabilities of different states of each PSF were assumed to be 50%. 
This means that in the experimental setup, for each participant, four out of the eight 
scenarios had a high level of each PSF and four had a low level of each PSF. Each 
participant was exposed to a combination of high and low levels of each PSF during each 
scenario as shown in Table 2. The probability of exposure to a level of PSF during a 
scenario was 50%.   
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6.2.2 Task Performance Nodes 
The CPT for the task performance values is populated from the experiment data that were 
collected using eight different scenarios. Table 7 shows the CPT at the node “Interaction 
with watertight doors” for Participant A61. As shown in the table, probabilities of closing 
fire doors in eight different conditions are needed in the CPT. The information in the 
rubric of Table 6 is transferred to the CPT. In this example, the participant closed all fire 
doors in seven scenarios, and did not close all fire doors in one scenario. As the 
probability of the event occurring is binary (i.e. the event fully happened, or it did not), 
the values 1 and 0 are used.  
Table 6: CPT data collected for "Interaction with watertight doors" 
Communication High  Low 
Hazard Proximity High Low  High Low 
Situation Familiarity High Low High Low  High Low High Low 
Close All Doors 1 1 1 0  1 1 1 1 
Did Not Close All 
Doors 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 
 
Table 7 shows the CPT of the node “Interaction with watertight doors”. CPTs of the other 
task performance nodes were populated in the same way from the participant’s 
performance data. Full Performance data and rubric for Participant A61 are available in 
Moyle and Veitch (2017).  
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After integrating all experimental data, the marginal probability of each task element 
occurring was calculated by the GeNie Modeller program.  
6.2.3 Category Nodes 
CPTs of category nodes and the final node are defined by the analyst. These definitions 
are based on the importance of different tasks to the specified categories. They are 
context sensitive and may need refinement before being used in a different application.  
For this study, the CPT was populated based on the analyst’s belief of what errors 
contributed to the failure of each category. For example, for “Spatial Awareness” 
category, the node values were “0” for any case that the task node was not in compliance. 
Table 8 shows the CPT table for the category node “Spatial Awareness”. In this CPT, the 
node values are “Yes” or “No” indicating compliance was achieved or not. As shown in 
the table, when “Spatial Awareness” is “Yes”, the node values are 1. This relates to when 
a participant selected the most efficient route or a deviated route, indicating the 
participant reached the muster location, and completed the muster sequence in an 
acceptable time defined by the analyst. For the category “Compliance with Safety 
Procedures”, the values of the node are also “Yes” or “No”. For this CPT, the “Yes” 
element reflects that all task performance nodes connected to the category are “Yes”, or 
in the positive status, which is the same for the CPT for the final node “Completion of 
Emergency Safety Procedures”. All category and final node CPTs are the same for all 
participants.  
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Table 7: CPT for Category Node: “Spatial Awareness" 
Time to Muster Less than 5 Min  More than 5 Min 
Select Efficient 
Route 
Most 
Efficient 
Deviated 
Route 
Does not 
Muster  
Most 
Efficient 
Deviated 
Route 
Does 
not 
Muster 
Spatial 
Awareness – 
Yes 
1 1 0  0 0 0 
Spatial 
Awareness -No 0 0 1  1 1 1 
 
6.3 Success Probability Analysis 
Once data was input into each CPT and the prior PSF values were given, the probability 
of successful completion of emergency procedures was calculated for each participant. 
This value indicates the strength of a participant’s knowledge of safety procedures and 
the ability to act appropriately in an emergency situation. This is valuable to the analysis 
as it is a prediction of how well a participant is likely to perform during an emergency 
situation.  
6.3.1 Success Probability - Individual Participants 
Performance results from AVERT can help determine how a participant is likely to 
perform in a real-life emergency situation (Musharraf et al., 2016). By using the 
performance results as data input into a BN, a numerical value of probability of success 
of an individual in a variety of offshore emergency situations can be calculated. To 
illustrate, Figure 9 shows the completed BN that quantifies the egress success probability 
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for participant A61. Participant A61 is shown to have an 87.5% chance of successfully 
completing an emergency situation.  
To demonstrate, an example calculation is presented below using the equations in section 
2.3. Performance of participant A61 is used here as the example. Prior probabilities of the 
status of the PSFs are known to be 50%. The CPTs for the relationships between PSFs 
and each task node are populated from the participant’s performance data in AVERT. 
CPTs along with the prior probabilities are used to calculate the marginal probability of 
the task nodes. For example, using the CPT table (Table 7) the marginal probability of the 
node “Interaction with Watertight doors” can be calculated as below. The other marginal 
probabilities for each task node are shown in Figure 9. 
𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
= 𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 =
𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ)  
+ 𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 =
𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  
+  𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 =
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ)  
+ 𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 =
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  
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+ 𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ,
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ)  
+ 𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 =
𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  
+ 𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 =
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ)  
+ 𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁| 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 =
𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿)  
= (1 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5) + (1 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5) +  (1 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5) +(0 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5) +  (1 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5) +  (1 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5) +(1 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5) +  (1 × 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5)  
= 0.875 
Therefore, 
𝐴𝐴 (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 = 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 1 − 0.875 = 0.125   
Once the task nodes are populated, the probability of the category nodes are calculated. 
Conditional probability tables are required to complete the calculation.  
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The “Spatial Awareness” node has input values from the “Route Selection” and “Time to 
Muster” nodes. To calculate the success probability of the “Spatial Awareness” node, the 
following equation is calculated using the CPT information from Table 8: 
𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 )   
=  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁. =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁. =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)    
 +  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁.  =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴( 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁. =  𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁.  =  𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑,𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴( 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁. =  𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)   
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁.  =  𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑,𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴( 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁. =  𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁.  =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴( 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)   
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+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁.  =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁.  =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
= (1 ×  0.625  ×  1.00) + (0 ×  0.625 x 0.00) +  (1 ×  0.375 ×  1.00) + (0 ×  0.375 ×  0.00) +  (0 ×  0.00 ×  1.00) +  (0 ×  0.00 ×  0.00)  
= 1.00  
Therefore, 
𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 1 − 1.00 = 0.00   
 The results for the other category node “Compliance with Safety Procedures” is shown 
in Figure 9.  
After the category nodes are calculated, probability of “Completion of Emergency Safety 
Procedures = Yes” is calculated. This node has inputs from the “Compliance with Safety 
Procedures”, “Spatial Awareness” and “Hazard Interaction” nodes. The equation used for 
calculation is: 
𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)  
= 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌│𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)  
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+  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌│𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)  
+  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)  
+  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌│𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
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+  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌│𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼),𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌│𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)  
+  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)  ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) 
+ 𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌│𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌)  
+  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌│𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 =  𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 = 𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌)   ×  𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) ×  𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑌𝑌. =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  
 =  (1 × 0.75 × 0.875 ×  1.00) +  (0 ×  0.75 ×  0.875 ×  0) +  (0 ×  0.75 ×  .125 × 1.00) +  (0 ×  0.75 ×  0.875 ×  0) + (1 ×  0.25 × 0.875 ×  1.00) +  (0 ×  0.25 × 0.875 ×  0) +  (0 ×  0.25 ×  0.125 ×  1.00) + (0 ×  0.25 ×  0.875 ×  0) +  (0 ×
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 0 ×  0.875 ×  1.00)  + (0 ×  0 ×  0.875 ×  0)  + (0 ×  0  ×  0.125 ×  1.00)  +  (0 × 0 ×  0.875 ×  0)  
= 0.875 
Therefore,  
𝐴𝐴(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 1 − 0.875 =  .125  
Therefore, as stated above, Participant A61 has a 87.5% chance of successfully 
completing an emergency situation. In comparison, the results for Participant A4 are 
shown in Figure 10. As shown in Figure 10, this participant has a 37.5% chance of 
successfully completing an emergency situation. This probability is calculated in the 
same way as Participant A61 as described above.  
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6.3.2 Success Probability –Cohort Summary 
The probability of successful completion of emergency safety procedures was calcuated 
for 37 participants using the method described in section 6.3.1. The results for the cohort 
are summarized in the histogram in Figure 11. All participants achieved some level of 
success. Twenty four participants had an 80% or higher probability of success. These 
participants retained the information provided in the training and could apply the 
knowledge and skills they acquired.  
Figure 11: Overall Success Probability Results 
6.4 Root Cause Analysis 
A benefit of using a BN to model participant performance is the flexibility to do a root-
cause analysis, which can be used to investigate the strength of influence of different 
PSFs on successful completion of emergency procedures (Musharraf et al., 2017).  
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Manipulation of the BN within GeNie Modeller can determine the effect each level of 
PSF has on the overall success probability.  
6.4.1 Root Cause Analysis - Individual Participants 
To demonstrate the benefit of the flexibility to manipulate a BN, a root-cause analysis 
was completed on all participants to investigate the strength of influence of different 
PSFs on success probabilities, and to identify the root causes of failure, given that the 
participant has failed.  
First, the effect of 100% failure occurring is demonstrated. Given that a failure in 
completing safety procedures has happened, probabilities of PSFs for each participant 
will change accordingly. The change in PSFs show how each PSF contributes to failure. 
For example, Figure 12 demonstrates the updated BN for Participant A61 given the 
evidence that a failure has happened. To demonstrate failure occurring, the value of 
failure in the node “Completion of Emergency Safety Procedures” is set to 100%.  
Table 9 shows the prior probability, posterior probability, and change in probability 
percentage point change of the PSFs when failure is 100%. Two PSFs, hazard proximity 
and situation familiarity, change to 100% (low). This indicates that when participant A61 
is in a relatively unfamiliar area and sees a hazard during mustering, they have a high 
probability of not completing emergency procedures successfully. This knowledge is 
beneficial as it highlights that additional training might usefully focus on conditions 
defined by the low level of these PSFs. In contrast, the communication PSF changes to 
100% (high). Despite having all relevant information to make an informed decision on  
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how to muster, the participant still has a high probability of not completing emergency 
procedures successfully, which indicates that the other two PSFs, hazard proximity and 
situation familiarity, may strongly affect the participants’ decision making more than the 
communication PSF.   
Table 8 : Prior Probability and Posterior Probability for Participant A61 
 
Hazard 
Proximity 
(Low) 
Hazard 
Proximity 
(High) 
Communication 
(Low) 
Communication 
(High) 
Situation 
Familiarity 
(Low) 
Situation 
Familiarity 
(High) 
Prior 
Probability 
(%) 
50 50 50 50 50 50 
Posterior 
Probability 
(%) 
100 0 0 100 100 0 
Change in 
Probability 
(percent 
points) 
+50 -50 -50 +50 +50 -50 
In comparison, Figure 13 demonstrates the updated BN for Participant A4 given the 
evidence that a failure has happened. 
Table 10 shows the prior probability, posterior probability, and percent change in 
probability of the PSFs when failure is 100%. The largest change is for situation 
familiarity.  This indicates that when in a relatively unfamiliar area, Participant A4 has a 
high probability of not completing emergency procedures successfully. As before, this 
knowledge is beneficial to the sample participant as it highlights where additional 
training might be most usefully focused.  
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Table 9: Prior Probability and Posterior Probability for Participant A4 
 
Hazard 
Proximity 
(Low) 
Hazard 
Proximity 
(High) 
Communication 
(Low) 
Communication 
(High) 
Situation 
Familiarity 
(Low) 
Situation 
Familiarity 
(High) 
Prior 
Probability 
(%) 
50 50 50 50 50 50 
Posterior 
Probability 
(%) 
60 40 40 60 80 20 
Change rate 
of 
Probability 
(%) 
10 -10 -10 10 30 -30 
 
Another application of the BN is that it can be used to assess the effect of each PSF on 
the success probability. To do so, each level of PSF is set to 100% one at a time and an 
assessment on how the success probability changes is made.  
Figure 14 shows how each PSF affects Participant A61’s probability of success. A 
tornado graph is used to demonstrate the change in success probability. From the graph, 
when the situation familiarity and hazard proximity PSFs have a high value of 100%, the 
success probability increases to 100% as well. When the communication PSF has a high 
value of 100%, the success probability decreases to 75%. This difference in value is due 
to the performance results in AVERT combined with manipulation of the PSF value. The 
results indicate Participant A61 had low performance results in scenarios when the 
communication PSF had a high value, and had high performance results in scenarios 
when the situation familiarity PSF and the hazard proximity PSF had a high value. The 
magnitude of the effect of each PSF on probability is the same, and it can be either 
positive or negative.  
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Figure 14: Tornado Graph for Participant A61 
Figure 15 shows how each PSF affects participant A4’s probability of success. From the 
graph, the situation familiarity PSF affects participant A4 the greatest. The range of 
success probability is from 0% to 75%.  
 
Figure 15: Tornado Graph for Participant A4 
 
P(PSF=High) 
P(PSF=High) 
P(PSF=High) 
P(PSF=Low) 
P(PSF=Low) 
P(PSF=Low) 
75 80 85 90 95 100
Haz. Prom.
Comm.
Sit. Fam.
Success Probability, % 
P(PSF=High) 
P(PSF=High) 
P(PSF=High) 
P(PSF=Low) 
P(PSF=Low) 
P(PSF=Low) 
0 20 40 60 80
Haz. Prox
Comm.
Sit. Fam.
Success Probability (%) 
   
 
67 
 
As illustrated by comparing Participant A61 to Participant A4, it is shown that 
individuals are affected by PSFs in different degrees. Therefore, it is important to assess 
skills and knowledge individually. 
6.4.2 Root Cause Analysis - Overall Cohort 
A root-cause assessment to determine the PSF that most affected the probability of 
success was done for all thirty-seven participants. Figure 16 presents a histogram that 
shows the results.  As shown in the figure, sixteen participants were not adversely 
affected by any change in PSF. These participants retained the information provided in 
the training and could apply the knowledge and skills they acquired regardless of the 
change in PSFs. As the PSF probabilities changed, the overall success probability 
remained at 100%. Nine participants were most affected by situation familiarity. 
Additional training relating to situation familiarity may be useful for these participants. 
Eleven participants were equally affected by all PSFs. This indicates that regardless of 
the change in PSF, success probability changed by the same amount. These participants 
may need to undergo further training in all areas relating to the PSFs.   
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Figure 16: Root Cause Analysis for 37 Participants 
6.5 Task Performance Errors 
In addition to assessing the likelihood of successful completion of emergency procedures, 
how successful the participants were in completing specific tasks was assessed. Task 
performance results contribute to the overall success probability. By assessing the task 
performance results, we can identify specific areas of the initial training program, or 
physical layout of the platform, that can be improved.    
Table 11 shows the performance tasks and the percentage of how successfully each task 
was completed across all scenarios and participants.   
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Table 10: Task Performance - Percentages 
Task Performance Requirement Percentage of Successful Completion 
Route Selection 
Participant selects most efficient route 
enabling them to muster as quickly as 
possible 
97% 
Muster Correctly 
Participant musters as per alarm type. 
Procedure to follow is defined per 
scenario. 
96% 
Gear Selection 
Participant selects gear as per location 
start. Procedure to follow is defined per 
scenario. 
89% 
Time to Muster 
Participant successfully musters and 
responds to correct alarm fully within 5 
minutes 
94% 
Hazard Interaction Participant does not interact with hazard 99% 
Interaction with 
Watertight Doors 
Participants closes all safety doors they 
go through 96% 
Safe Pace Participants walk throughout scenarios 99% 
 
The task performance node with the lowest percentage of success was “Gear Selection”. 
There are four scenarios that started in a platform location that was unfamiliar to the 
participant. The process during an emergency situation is to muster, and retrieve safety 
gear at the muster location as needed.  From evaluation of the data, it appears that some 
participants did not retain the information that there was additional safety gear present at 
the muster station. This resulted in these participants returning to their cabin to select 
safety gear, which is against safety procedures. Additional training information could be 
given to enhance this knowledge on an individual basis, or the overall training program 
could be adjusted for everyone. As well, additional physical reminders on the platform of 
safety gear locations could be installed.  
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The next performance task node that had a lower success percentage was “Time to 
Muster”. From a review of the data, it was noted that the majority of errors occurred 
when the situation familiarity PSF was in the low level. The scenarios that had a low 
level of situation familiarity PSF started in the control room. It is assumed participants 
were not confident when in this location on how to find the primary route to the muster 
station, or could not locate an area as requested in an acceptable time. This error is tied to 
the performance task node “Route Selection”. More often than not, participants selected 
the secondary route no matter what information was available from the other PSFs. This 
indicates that route designation of primary or secondary was not made clear in the 
training, so participants were not able to make a good decision on route selection based 
on priority. Initial training could benefit from further testing to increase spatial awareness 
of other locations in the platform.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis presents a methodology to investigate the effect of PSFs on offshore 
emergency egress and muster actions using a virtual environment. The results show that a 
person’s response during an emergency situation can be probabilistically quantified using 
the BN approach. Manipulation of the BN enables a review of which PSF(s) affected 
individuals during emergency scenarios. The results allow for adaptive training to enable 
individuals to improve on the areas where they are less than competent. It also shows 
areas that participants are stronger in, thus indicating the potential for taking on more 
leadership roles in an emergency situation. This benefit addresses the points made in Flin 
Flin & Slaven (1995) that state understanding how participants make decisions in a high 
pressure simulated environment can provide insight into the reactions they may 
experience in a real life situation and determine if they are competent to command an 
emergency.    
The results also show other information that can lead to an improvement in initial safety 
training. Most participants were affected by the situation familiarly PSF, indicating 
participants could not apply the knowledge and skills learned to an area they were not 
familiar with. As the situation familiarity PSF was the PSF that affected participants’ 
success probability the most, it indicates additional training in spatial awareness would be 
required to improve the probability of successful completion of emergency procedures.  
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The PSFs selected for this experiment were based on the experience and opinion of the 
researcher and the research group. It is noted that other PSFs can be selected and 
developed for different scenarios. This may result in different results for each individual. 
The results presented are specific to the selected experiment PSFs. To determine if other 
factors affect an individual’s results, the experiment would need to be repeated with new 
PSFs.  
This study also primarily focuses on individual human factors. Future work would benefit 
from inclusion of organizational and teamwork performance shaping factors. The 
addition of such factors would demonstrate the importance of a company`s safety 
management program and how well an individual performs in a group situation. 
Examples of how to implement these factors would be to create a training program where 
participants can interact with other participants or agents to complete the required tasks 
during an emergency situation.  
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